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I. Introduction
A. Motivation  
The greatest revolution triggered by the widespread use of smartphones 
is that “sharing,” “recommending,” and “doing activities with friends” 
have become extremely easy via social networking services (SNS). This 
“sharing” function allows individuals to appreciate, work on, and evaluate 
their content with others by simply clicking a “share” button. This con- 
venient function is rapidly transforming conventional content and indu- 
stries. This trend is mostly aimed to generate direct network externalities.
A real-life transition resulting from the widespread use of smartphones 
is demonstrated in the way people play games. Before the mobile era, 
games were frequently played by only one player or with a few others. 
However, mobile games based on SNS platforms allow users to enjoy 
the games with their friends or acquaintances whose contacts are in 
their mobile phones. Players are no longer limited by time and space 
because they can play a game with anyone at any time through the 
SNS platforms that the game is based on. For example, Facebook, the 
social network giant with 1.3 billion users, provides a game platform in 
which users can complete missions and compare scores with their 
Facebook friends. Line and Kakao, which are mobile messenger apps 
with 600 million and 140 million users, respectively, also provide plat- 
forms for mobile games. Users can now enjoy playing games with 
friends on their list and even receive invitations from their friends to 
keep on playing. Thus, users invite more friends to play games, which 
significantly contributes to the rapid popularization of mobile games.
Another influence of the “sharing” function is demonstrated in the 
change in the consumption patterns of printed content, such as news- 
paper and books. Social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, show 
articles that the friends of their users have read, recommend topics that 
users may be interested in based on the articles that their friends are 
reading, and display these articles on the top of their list. Amazon pro- 
vides a review service to buyers. Buyers are encouraged to recommend 
good books and leave reviews for those books, which urge users to 
purchase books frequently. All these functions are intended to generate 
direct network effect.
The increasing use of content recommendation services based on the 
consumption pattern of users’ friends has become notable in e- 
commerce. The movie review website “Watcha” distinguishes itself from 
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other movie review websites by offering a sharing function. Users share 
their reviews with their Facebook friends, and this practice encourages 
users to share their movie experiences. Airbnb, the largest website in 
the world for people who rent out accommodations, provides a sharing 
function through Facebook or Google accounts. Users can share infor- 
mation about the accommodation facilities where they have stayed to 
help their friends or acquaintances find good accommodations. This 
website also provides a “review” from other users, which can generate 
accurate information as the number of users increases. Thus, these 
trends of “sharing” or “recommending” allow the identification of “good” 
products or contents, thereby leading to their frequent consumption. 
These trends are certainly driven by the widespread use of smartphones. 
If web-centric software platforms were “likely to produce changes that 
dwarf the revolution we have seen in the last quarter century (Evans, 
Hagiu, and Schmalensee (2006))”, then this phrase definitely applies to 
“smartphone-centric” platforms at present.
Services that prompt users to frequently “share,” “recommend,” “invite,” 
or “do activities” with friends or other users have a two-sided structure. 
For example, social networks, such as Facebook, Line, and Kakao, provide 
platforms where users can access, download, and play games with 
friends (or other users of that service). The games provided through these 
websites are originally produced by mobile game developers. That is, three 
parties are involved: content users (game players), platforms (Facebook, 
Line, and Kakao), and content developers (game developers). Amazon also 
functions as a platform. The company mediates between publishers and 
consumers. Facebook and Twitter do not publish news articles them- 
selves. They simply provide platforms where news articles can be posted, 
and then encourage users to read articles that their friends (or other 
users) are reading. Airbnb is also a two-sided market because it offers an 
open platform for users who want to provide and find places for lodging. 
Thus, the development of mobile technology primarily changes the 
structure of the two-sided market. Although conventional two-sided plat- 
form markets were characterized by the cross-network effect among dif- 
ferent groups (or end users), incorporating direct network effect within a 
group (or within-network effect) is necessary. Despite the ubiquitous 
existence of this type of market structure, limited work has been con- 
ducted to examine its effect on the business strategies of platforms. A 
number of questions naturally emerge. Should platforms subsidize a 
group with direct network effect to attract more buyers, or should they 
penalize the group and extract additional surplus generated by direct 
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network effect? This problem is not trivial because of the two-sided 
market structure. Any change in price charged to the group with a 
direct network effect will exert an indirect effect on the demand of the 
other group. Thus, the optimal price charged to the other group changes, 
which in turn affects the price charged to the former group. The answer 
depends on the competitive nature of a market.
Another important feature is that competition between platforms is 
becoming prevalent. Facebook and Twitter are not only vying to be the 
leading SNS in the world, but their contents and annexed services are 
competing as well. Mobile messenger services, such as Line and Kakao, 
are aggressively competing for mobile game platform services. Thus, 
analyzing platform competition in the presence of both direct and cross- 
network externalities is necessary.
To contribute to the recent two-sided platform market literature, this 
work seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What is the optimal 
pricing strategy of monopoly/duopoly platform(s) where one side of a 
group enjoys direct network effect? (2) Compared with the case where no 
direct network effect exists, which side enjoys discount (or conversely, 
which side is penalized) by introducing such effect? Does the competiti- 
veness of a market affect the result? (3) How does the magnitude of 
direct network effect affect the pricing strategy of platforms? This study 
determines that competition among platforms may induce them to re- 
duce the price charged to the group with direct network effect, and this 
trend is reinforced as the magnitude of direct network effect increases.
Accordingly, direct network effect is introduced in a rather conventional 
two-sided market. Each end user group is denoted as “buyers” and 
“sellers” or “buyer-side” and “seller-side” in some cases, and direct network 
effect is assumed to exist only in the buyer-side. Buyers in mobile game 
platforms can be regarded as game players, whereas sellers represent 
game developers. In SNS platforms, such as Facebook or Twitter, buyers 
are SNS users and sellers are content providers.
Introducing direct network effect into a two-sided market generates 
two counteracting effects on the pricing decision of a platform. On the 
one hand, it directly increases marginal utility on the buyer-side, thereby 
encouraging potential buyers who have previously not joined the 
platform to join it. This effect (called demand-augmenting effect) allows 
the platform to increase the price charged to buyers. On the other 
hand, an increase in buyer-side price will dramatically reduce buyer-side 
demand for the platform compared with the case without direct network 
effect because the decrease in demand will be exacerbated by direct 
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network effect. A reduction in demand implies a dwindling direct network 
effect, which indicates lower marginal utility for a given buyer-side 
price. This effect (called demand-sensitizing effect) provides incentive 
for a platform to lower buyer-side price because reducing price will attract 
more buyers, which in turn will enhance direct network effect. Increased 
marginal utility, which Is generated by direct network effect, will attract 
more buyers. This study shows that competition among platforms re- 
latively amplifies demand-sensitizing effect because competition restricts 
demand-augmenting effect by causing competing platforms to split total 
demand, whereas demand for one platform will be more sensitive to price 
increase because of the presence of its competitor. Demand-augmenting 
effect dominates under a monopoly platform, whereas demand-sensitizing 
effect prevails under a duopoly framework. If demand-sensitizing effect 
dominates, then each platform discounts buyer-side price and raises 
seller-side price. In this case, the sum of prices that is charged to buyers 
and sellers decreases. This scenario is consistent with the pricing con- 
vention of platforms under a competitive environment. These real-world 
platforms typically charge low fees (or even allow free usage of platform 
services) to customers and charge high fees to content providers. Fur- 
thermore, this scenario has particular implications for the antitrust 
policy. Although buyer-side prices charged by competing platforms appear 
“too” low, these prices may simply reflect a strong direct network effect 
and not anticompetitive predatory pricing or dumping.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. The pricing 
decisions of a monopoly platform are analyzed in Section II. In Section 
III, the competition between two platforms is modeled à la Hotelling. 
Comparative statistics are provided in Section IV. I conclude in Section 
V.
B. Related Literature
The current work is closely related to several strands of existing 
research. The first strand is related to general price theory on two-sided 
platform markets (mostly focusing on monopoly platform). The second 
strand focuses on the competition issue in two-sided markets. Third, 
this work is related to literature analyzing direct network externalities 
(Katz, and Shapiro 1985; Liebowitz, and Margolis 1994). Finally, this 
paper is in line with literature on oligopoly market focusing on inter- 
action among competing firms (Bulow et al., 1985; Ryu, and Kim 2011).
The pioneering works of Rochet, and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Armstrong 
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(2006) describe price theory on two-sided platforms in the absence of 
direct network effect. In Rochet, and Tirole (2003), total price, which is 
defined as the sum of prices imposed to each side, is given by Lerner’s 
formula, and the price structure (i.e., prices imposed to each side) is 
provided by the ratio of the demand elasticity of each side. Although 
the prices considered by Rochet, and Tirole (2003) are a per- 
transaction-based “usage fee,” they incorporate interaction-independent 
fixed fees called “membership charges” into the model.    
Weyl (2010) develops a general theory on pricing decision for a multi- 
sided platform market. He shows how a monopoly platform sets prices 
in a multi-sided market, where agents have a general form of utility 
that subsumes those considered in Rochet, and Tirole (2003, 2006) and 
Armstrong (2006). The general utility considered in his model subsumes 
the possible existence of both direct and cross-network effects. He 
transforms the problems of monopoly platforms from price selection to 
desired allocations by introducing insulating tariffs to avoid coordination 
failure. Weyl demonstrates that even in this general framework, the 
profit-maximizing allocations and prices of monopolists cause classical 
market power distortion; however, distortion is generated by only inter- 
nalizing network externalities to marginal users (Spence 1975). However, 
he focuses on providing a general theory and not specifically on direct 
network effect. Thus, Weyl does not explicitly investigate how the intro- 
duction of direct network effect changes the pricing decisions of plat- 
forms compared with the case where no effect occurs. He also does not 
consider competition among multiple platforms, which is more consis- 
tent with real-world platform markets. 
Modeling competition between two platforms is a difficult task given 
the nature of two-sidedness. Rochet, and Tirole (2003) note that many 
merchants accept both Amex and Visa cards, and some buyers use 
both cards. This possibility of multi-homing either sides of end users 
complicates the illustration of competition among multiple platforms. 
Rochet, and Tirole (2003) address this issue by constructing a formal 
model that captures the nature of competing platforms. Suppose that 
one platform offers a lower price to sellers than its rival. Each seller 
must choose whether to join the cheaper platform or both platforms. A 
trade-off occurs because if the seller joins both platforms, he/she can 
transact with a larger subset of buyers. However, less buyers use the 
platform that offers a cheaper price to the seller compared with the 
case where the seller only joins the cheaper platform. Each competing 
platform can encourage sellers to stop multi-homing and join only its 
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platform, which is called “steering,” by undercutting the rival platform. 
In the current study, homogeneous products are assumed to avoid multi- 
homing issue because this work aims to clarify the direct effect on the 
pricing decision of platforms in the presence of direct network effect. 
Incorporating multi-homing issue is a potential future research topic.
Caillaud, and Jullien (2003) analyze the intermediation market by 
focusing on cross-network externalities, non-exclusivity of services, and 
price discrimination, which are relevant for informational intermediation 
via the Internet. They formulate the problem as an imperfect competition 
between two matchmakers in the presence of cross-network externalities 
where matched end users bargain to determine how the total net trade 
surplus is split. They show that an equilibrium with efficient market 
structure exists, and that the efficient structure may involve a mono- 
polistic intermediary or duopolistic intermediaries with non-exclusive tech- 
nologies and low costs. They also demonstrate the possible existence of 
an inefficient equilibrium that involves multi-homing on one side and 
single-homing on the other side.
Although the model of Rochet, and Tirole (2003) has direct implications 
on the payment card industry where fees are charged on a per-transaction 
basis, Armstrong (2006) models the competition among platforms that 
charge lump-sum fees. His models are applicable to markets such as 
shopping malls or newspapers. Armstrong provides three models for 
two-sided markets: (1) a monopoly platform model, (2) a model for 
competing platforms where agents join a single platform, and (3) a model 
for competing platforms where one side of agents join all platforms 
(called “competitive bottlenecks”). He shows that each platform in the 
competitive bottleneck model where sellers multi-home only considers 
the joint surplus of the platform and its buyers and disregards the 
interests of sellers. Thus, each platform encourages few sellers to join 
unlike that in the social optimum. 
The research question of Parker, and van Alstyne (2005) may be the 
closest to that in the current work. They analyze two-sidedness, which 
focuses on information products, and theoretically demonstrate the 
condition where a free-goods market (e.g., streaming media companies 
provide consumers with free software players but charge developers to 
create content) may exist. Parker and van Alstyne determine which side 
of a two-sided market obtains a discount. They show that if the increment 
to profit for one complementary good exceeds the lost in profit for the 
other good, then a discount or subsidy becomes profit maximizing. Thus, 
free-goods markets can exist whenever the profit-maximizing price of 
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zero or less generates cross-network externality benefits that are greater 
than intramarket losses. However, their work focuses on cross-network 
effect and disregards direct network effect within a group, which is 
prevalent in the information product market. 
White, and Weyl (2012) propose a novel solution concept of residual 
insulated equilibrium for platform competition. This new solution concept 
resolves the “indeterminancy problem” that frequently emerges in the 
analysis of competition among platforms. They generalize the model to 
accommodate direct network effect. Thus, the work is clearly related to 
the current study. However, White and Weyl focus on proposing a new 
solution concept and resolving equilibrium indeterminancy and have 
not thoroughly investigated the effect of introducing direct network effect. 
By contrast, the current work compares platform competition with and 
without direct network effect, thereby focusing on equilibrium prices 
between the two cases. The current work adopts the framework of Rochet, 
and Tirole (2003) because it compares the prices between the two cases 
and provides comparative statistics.
II. Monopoly Platform
A. Basic Framework
Platforms that utilize smart technology, particularly platforms based 
on SNS, mostly charge fees on a per-transaction basis and benefit from 
usage.1 The present study does not consider membership charge, which 
is considered in Rochet, and Tirole (2006) nor membership benefit, 
which is considered in Weyl (2010). A model is developed based on the 
work of Rochet, and Tirole (2003) because its structure can subsume 
the substantial realistic features of mobile content platforms. Unlike 
that of Rochet, and Tirole (2003), this work considers cross-network 
effect generated between buyers and sellers as well as direct network 
effect among buyers. A monopoly platform that mediates transactions 
between pairs of end users with buyers (superscript B) and sellers 
(superscript S) is provided as an example. Let the platform’s marginal 
1 For example, platforms for mobile games charge fees on a per-transaction 
basis. If a game user buys an “item” in the game, a fraction of the item price is 
transferred to the platform. “Emoticons” or “stickers” can be purchased by users 
of messenger services. Fees are charged per-transaction (i.e., whenever a mes- 
senger user buys a package of “emoticons” designed by a designer, fees are 
charged by the intermediating platform). Thus, platforms benefit from usage.
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FIGURE 1
BUYER-SIDE DEMAND FOR EACH pB
cost of transaction be given by c＞0. In the absence of fixed usage costs 
and fixed fees, the demand of the buyer-side (seller-side) depends on 
price pB (pS) imposed by the monopoly platform. 
The monopoly platform chooses prices to maximize its profit. The 
pricing decision of the platform clearly depends on the demands of the 
buyer-side and seller-side for the platform (which will be formally 
defined in a later section), and the demand for the platform of each 
group is determined by thegross surplus of a group. Suppose that the 




(pB)),                       (1)
where b
B is a random variable that is uniformly distributed at an 
interval of [0, b̅B], D1
B (pB) denotes the buyer-side demand, and v(‧) is a 
direct network externality function adapted from Katz, and Shapiro 
(1985). Assume that v(0)＝0, v’(z)＞0, and v”(z)≤0 for all z∈[0, 1]. 
Assume also that b̅
B＞v’(0). (v’(D1
B))/b̅B is the marginal benefit from the 
unit increase of demand. The assumption guarantees that the marginal 
benefit from the unit increase of demand is always less than one. This 
assumption effectively defines and stabilizes the demand function by 
bounding the size of direct network externalities.
Figure 1 illustrates how buyer-side demand D1
B
(pB) is defined and 
compares it with hypothetical demand D0
B
 without direct network effect. 
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FIGURE 2
BUYER-SIDE DEMAND
The latter is defined as D0
B (pB)≡Pr[bB≥pB]＝1－(pB/b̅B). If pB≥b̅B, then 
D1
B (pB)≡0. This condition corresponds to point A in Figure 1. Let p̲B be 
the highest price that achieves D1
B (p̲B)＝1. If pB≤p̲B, then D1
B (pB)≡1 is 
defined as the upper bound of the number of buyers, which is one. 
This value corresponds to point C. If p
B∈[p̲B, b̅B], then D1
B
(pB)≡NB∈(0,
1] is uniquely determined as a fixed point of NB＝Pr[bB＋v(NB)≥pB](＝1－
(p
B－v(NB))/b̅B) or equivalently 
b̅B NB＝b̅B－pB＋v(NB).                       (2)
Figure 2 shows the corresponding demand curve where A’, B’, and C’ 
correspond to A, B, and C in Figure 1, respectively.
The monopolist platform will not choose p
B＜p̲B. Thus, pB≥p̲B is 
assumed. The buyer-side demand exhibits the following properties:
Remark 1.
(i) Downward sloping: 
     dD1
B
       1                                  ∂D1
B
          ＝          ＜0 for all pB≤b̅B; otherwise,      ＝0.
     dpB   b̅B－v’(D1
B
)                              ∂pB
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(ii) Concavity: 
                     dD1
B
             v”(D1
B
)‧                                       d2 D1
B            
dpB                               d2 D1
B
         ＝－             ≤0 for all pB≤b̅B; otherwise,       ＝0.2 
     dp
B2     {b̅B－v’(D1
B
)}2                               dpB2
This condition indicates the concavity of log D1
B
.
Direct network effect among sellers is not considered. Thus, the gross 
per transaction surplus is given by b
S, which is assumed to be uni- 
formly distributed on [0, b̅S] and independent from bB. If pS＜b̅S, then 
the demand function of the seller is defined as
                                        p
S   
DS (pS)≡Pr[bS≥pS]＝1－    ∈(0, 1].                 (3)
                                       b̅S
If pS≥b̅S, then DS (pS)≡0.
This demand specification for each group, which is based on the 
work of Rochet, and Tirole (2003), has several advantages. In addition 
to its simplicity, this approach makes the decision of each side in- 
dependent from the demand level of the other side. This condition does 
not indicate that cross-network effect does not exist between two groups. 





(t)dt and VS (pS)≡∫pS
b̅S DS (t)dt. By assuming that bB and bS are 
independent, which is consistent with with the work of Rochet, and 
Tirole (2003), the average net surplus on each side is given by 
W
B (pB, pS)≡VB (pB)‧DS (pS),                        (4)
WS (pS, pB)≡VS (pS)‧D1
B
(pB).                        (5)
As the demand on one side (e.g., seller-side) increases, the other side 
(e.g., buyer-side) will have more opportunities to transact, which increases 
the average net surplus of the latter side (buyer-side). This condition 
captures cross-network effect among end users. However, in the demand 
specification from Rochet, and Tirole (2003), the decision of each end 
user becomes independent from the level of the other side’s demand, 
whereas the monopoly platform considers cross-network effect in deciding 
2 If v”(z)＜0 ∀z∈[0, 1], then the inequality becomes strict.
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price. The current work focuses on how network externalities (both 
direct and cross) affect the pricing decision of a platform. Thus, this 
demand specification appears sufficient to capture the concepts to be 
analyzed in this study.
B. Pricing Decision
By assuming that bB and bS are independent, the probability that the 
monopoly platform (charging pB, pS to each side) successfully mediates 
the transaction between the two groups is given by D1
B (pB) × DS (pS)∈[0, 
1]. Per-transaction profit is given by (p
B＋pS－c). Thus, the monopoly 






 and DS are log concave.3 Thus, this maximization problem is 
characterized by the first order conditions (FOCs), i.e., 
            ∂(log π )       1        1    dDB (pB)
        ＝          ＋                ＝0,
              ∂pB    pB＋pS－c   DB (pB)   (dpB)
             ∂(log π )      1         1   dDS (pS)
       ＝          ＋                ＝0.
              ∂p
S   (pB＋pS－c)  DS (pS)   (dpS)
Marginal cost c is sufficiently small. Thus, the monopoly platform 
never chooses p




B (pB))],                 (6)
pB＋pS－c＝b̅S－pS.                         (7)
Prices p
B and pS, which solve Equations (6) and (7), characterize the 
optimal pricing decision of the monopoly platform, which are denoted 
as p̂
B and p̂S.
By defining the elasticity of buyer-side demand D1
B
 as 
           p
B  dD1




(pB)≡－         ＝              
          D1
B  dpB   D1
B [b̅B－v’(D1
B)]
3 See Remark 1 (ii).
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and that of sellers as 
        pS  dDS     pS
εS (pS)≡－         ＝       , 
          DS  dpS    b̅S－pS
we obtain a generalized result of Proposition 1 from Rochet, and Tirole 
(2003) under direct network effect among buyers. Equations (6) and (7) 







For notational simplicity, denote ε ̂1B≡ε1B (b̂B) and ε ̂S≡εS (p̂S). Assume 
that the total volume elasticity in the equilibrium ε ̂1≡ε ̂1B＋ε ̂S exceeds 
one. Then, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 1.
(i) The total price of the monopoly platform p̂≡p̂
B＋p̂S is given by the 
standard Lerner formula for the total volume elasticity as follows: 
                             (p̂－c)  1
      ＝   .                           (8)
                               p̂     ε ̂1
(ii) The price structure is given by the ratio of elasticities as follows: 
                              p̂B    p̂S
    ＝    .                            (9)
                             ε ̂1B    ε ̂S
The closed form equilibrium prices are provided in Appendix 1. The 
characterization of the equilibrium prices is described in detail in the 
next subsection.
C. With Direct Network Effect versus Without Direct Network Effect
This study focuses on the effect of introducing direct network exter- 
nalities on the optimal behavior of platforms. Following the convention 
of Parker, and van Alstyne (2005), the optimal prices under both net- 
work effects are compared only with those with cross-network effect. 
The two countering pressures on buyer-side price caused by direct net- 
work effect will be demonstrated by comparing the equilibrium prices of 
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the two cases. This pressure on buyer-side price transmits to seller-side 
price in the opposite direction because of cross-network effect.
The equilibrium prices of the benchmark case (i.e., without direct 
network effect) are derived by assuming v(z)≡0, ∀z∈[0, 1]. 
      1                     1                    1
p̃B＝  [2b̅B－b̅S＋c],    p̃S＝  [2b̅S－b̅B＋c],    p̃＝  [b̅B＋b̅S＋c].  (10)
      3                     3                    3
The elasticity of the buyer-side demand in the benchmark case is 
defined as 
           p
B  dD0




(pB)≡－         ＝       ; 
          D0
B  
dpB   b̅B－pB
and ε0
B
(p̃B), ε1B  (p̃B), εS (p̃S) are denoted as ε ̃0B, ε ̃1B, ε ̃S, respectively.
In the case where both direct and cross-network effects occur, equi- 
librium prices p̂B and p̂S are characterized by Proposition 1. The fol- 
lowing theorem indicates who enjoys a discount and who is penalized 
by introducing direct network effect and compares these conditions 
with the case where this effect does not exist in a monopolistic two- 
sided platform market. ε ̃0B, ε ̃1B, and ε ̃S are the elasticities evaluated at 
benchmark equilibrium prices p̃B and p̃S, whereas ε ̂1B and ε ̂S are those 
evaluated at the equilibrium prices when both direct and cross-network 
effects p̂
B and p̂S occur. Define p≡pB＋pS.
Theorem 1. 
Solutions p̂
B and p̂S can be used to solve Equations (8) and (9). 
Moreover, p̂B≥p̃B, p̂S≤p̃S, and p̂≥p̃ hold, where equalities are satisfied if 
and only if 
v(D1
B (p̃B))





Proof. The existence and uniqueness of the solution are demonstrated 
in an alternative proof provided in Appendix 2. This proof shares a 
symmetric logic to that of Theorem 2 (duopoly case). Thus, the logic of 
the proof of Theorem 2, which may be complicated because of the 
extensive calculation, is clarified.
A simpler version, which exploits the closed form equilibrium prices 
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FIGURE 3
BUYER-SIDE DEMAND
provided in Appendix 1, is provided given the existence and the uni- 
queness of the solution. Assume p̂B＜p̃B. Thus, 
 
                 1               2
p̂




                 3               3
                     2
              ＝p̃B＋   {v(D̂1B)－D̂1B‧v’(D̂1B)}
                     3







) holds based on Jensen’s inequality, 
which is contradicting. Thus, p̂B≥p̃B holds. 
p̂S≤p̃S and p̂≥p̃ can be similarly shown.                          □
In the alternative proof provided in Appendix 2, ε ̃̃1B＜ε ̃̃0B always holds 
in a monopoly platform case. The reason why buyer-side elasticity 
decreases for given price p̃B is graphically illustrated in Figure 3. For 
given price p̃B, the elasticity of D0B at point a is ε ̃̃0B. The elasticity of D1B 
at point c is ε ̃̃1B. A linear demand curve connects (b̅B be). The elasticity 
of (b̅B be) at b is equal to that of D0
B
 evaluated at a. Thus, the following 
holds: 
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FIGURE 4
 DEMAND-AUGMENTING EFFECT VS. DEMAND-SENSITIZING EFFECT
             (p̃B, 0)   (p̃B, 0)
ε ̃̃0B＝ε (Bb̅B be)＝       ＞       ＝ε ̃̃1B, 
            (b̅B, p̃B)   (d, p̃B)
where (m, n) denotes the length of the line that connects points m and 
n. Parker, and van Alstyne (2005) also point out that network effect 
makes demand more inelastic as the “size” of the demand increases, 
although the increase in size stemmed from cross-network effect in 
their context.
Note that ε ̃̃1B＜ε ̃̃0B can be rewritten as 
 D1
B
(p̃B)   dD1B (p̃B)/dpB
        ＞              . 
 D0
B
(p̃B)   dD0B (p̃B)/dpB
In the alternative proof in Appendix 2, D1
B
(p̃B)＞D0B (p̃B) and b̅B－v’(D1B (p̃B))
＜b̅
B always hold, and the second inequality can be written as 
   dD1
B
(p̃B)      dD01 (p̃B)
(－        )＞(－        ). 
     dpB          dpB
Thus, direct network effect introduces two effects. For a given equilibrium 
price without direct network effect (p̃B), introducing such effect (i) direc- 
tly increases buyer-side demand and (ii) raises the absolute value of the 
first derivative of demand with respect to buyer-side price. The latter 
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effect implies that under direct network effect, buyer-side demand de- 
creases more sharply as price rises. The former is called demand- 
augmenting effect, and the latter is called demand-sensitizing effect. 
Thus, ε ̃̃1B＜ε ̃̃0B indicates that in a monopoly case, the demand- 











do the two effects balance out. These two counteracting effects on buyer- 
side are decomposed in Figure 4. The left panel shows how demand- 
augmenting effect causes platforms to increase buyer-side price. The 
platform has an incentive to increase p
B to extract the marginal utility 
of buyers generated by direct network effect. The right panel indicates 
how demand-sensitizing effect generates downward pressure on pB. By 
reducing buyer-side price, the platform can increase buyer-side demand 
at a larger magnitude compared with the case without direct network 
effect, which is profitable. 
The principle behind Theorem 1 is straightforward. ε ̃̃1B≤ε ̃̃0B indicates 
that for given equilibrium prices p̃B and p̃S without direct network effect, 
the introduction of direct network effect causes the elasticity of buyer-side 
demand to become “too” inelastic. This result demonstrates that equi- 
librium prices without direct network effect cannot be supported as equi- 
librium prices if direct network effect is introduced. Buyer-side demand 
becomes too inelastic because demand-augmenting effect dominates 
demand-sensitizing effect under the monopoly platform. Section III ex- 
plains that this result this is closely related to the competitive nature of 
the platform market. Demand loss when a platform increases buyer- 
side price is limited because of monopolistic power, which results in 
moderate demand-sensitizing effect. Section III explains that introducing 
competition among platforms can reverse the relative magnitude of 
demand-augmenting and demand-sensitizing effects. Hence, the optimal 
buyer-side price under direct network effect is higher than the optimal 
price without direct network effect. 
Meanwhile, introducing direct network effect on the buyer-side trans- 
mits to the seller-side because of cross-network effect. Under p̃B and p̃S, 
the elasticity of seller-side demand becomes relatively more elastic than 
that of buyer-side demand. Hence, equilibrium prices without direct 
network effect can no longer be supported as the optimal price under 
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direct network effect. The platform acquires an incentive to decrease pS, 
thereby inducing a substantial increase in seller-side demand. In this 
manner, the platform balances the demands of the the end users to 




The case of a duopoly, where two platforms, namely, i＝1, 2, compete 
for the market, is considered in this section. The products of sellers are 
identical but different in location. Consequently, multi-homing does not 
occur unlike in the other studies mentioned earlier.
The analysis is based on a variant of Hotelling’s model, where the 
preferences for platforms of a buyer (seller) are represented by his/her 
location x (y) on a line. Buyer-side price imposed by platform i is 
denoted as pi
B
 and seller-side price as pi
S
. Similar to the linear demand 
specification considered in Rochet, and Tirole (2003), buyers are assumed 
to be uniformly distributed at a close interval of [－(Δ/2)－δ, (Δ/2)＋δ ]. 
Furthermore, sellers are also assumed to be uniformly distributed at  
[－(Δ/2)－δ , (Δ/2)＋δ ]. Platforms 1 and 2 are symmetrically located at a 
distance Δ/2 from the origin of the line. That is, platform 1 is located 
at －Δ/2 and platform 2 at Δ/2. In addition, buyers and sellers are 
assumed to have access to outside options, which are represented by 
two other symmetric platforms located at －(Δ/2)－δ  and Δ/2＋δ , and 
denoted as platforms 01 and 02, respectively. Platform 0i provides a net 
surplus b0
B
 to buyers and b0
S
 to sellers who join it, but does not 
generate direct network effect. Markets are assumed to be covered in 
the sense that all buyers and sellers should join at least one of the four 
platforms and should join only one of these platforms.
Introducing an outside option has the following advantage. If the 
standard Hotelling’s model, where platforms 1 and 2 are located at the 
end points, is used, then pi
B and pi
S cannot be pinned down. Only the 




 is determined. This indeterminancy mainly 
arises from the fact that when full coverage and symmetry of the 
network externality function is assumed, the demand of each platform 
will be 1/2 regardless of whether direct network effect is present. This 
indeterminancy remains even if we introduce direct network effect. This 
problem can be resolve by providing outside options to each agent.














), where i≠j. Let the gross-per-transaction surplus of a buyer 









)), (i≠j),               (11)
where v(‧) is a common externality function that satisfies v(0)＝0, v’(z)＞
0, and v”(z)≤0 for all z∈[0, 1], and bB is fixed across buyers. For 
simplicity, b
B is assumed to be independent from the platform choice of 
buyers.










－t|x－xi|,               (12)
where t denotes a transportation cost,4 and x1≡－(Δ/2), x2≡Δ/2.
Meanwhile, if a buyer chooses the outside option platform 0i (i＝1, 2), 
then his/her net surplus will be b0
B
, but he/she will be unable to enjoy 
additional surplus generated by direct network effect. Thus, if a buyer 
located at x chooses platform 0i, then his/her utility will be  
b0
B
－t|x－x0i|,                         (13)
where x01＝－(Δ/2)－δ  and x02＝(Δ/2)＋δ. Buyers located on [－(Δ/2)－δ,
0) will never choose platform 02, and those on (0, (Δ/2)＋δ ] will never 
choose platform 01. b
B and b0
B
 are assumed to be sufficiently large, and 
4 The term t|x－xi| can be interpreted as a measure of the dissatisfaction of 
buyer x with platform i.
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thus, buyer-side market is fully covered.5
The upper left of Figure 5 depicts the net surplus of a buyer located 
at x1 who chooses platform 01, whereas the middle depicts the net sur- 





, let xL̄, x ̄M, and x ̄R be the locations of a buyer who 
is indifferent between platforms 01 and 1, 1 and 2, and 2 and 02, re- 
spectively. Then, as illustrated in Figure 5, the buyer-side demand for 






)＝(1/(2δ＋Δ))(xM̄－xL̄), and that 
for platform 2 by D1
B
2＝(1/(2δ＋Δ))(xL̄－xM̄). That is, buyer-side demand 
for platform i (i＝1, 2) is implicitly determined by the following equations: 
        1     1                     1    1
D1
B









     (2δ＋Δ)  2t                  (2δ＋Δ)  2t
(14)




        1     1                     1    1
D1
B




1)]＋           [(p1
B－2p2
B)
     (2δ＋Δ)  2t                  (2δ＋Δ)  2t
(15)
   ＋(b
B－b0
B)＋t(δ＋Δ)].
For comparison, consider the case with no direct network effect. In 
this case, the gross-per-transaction surplus of a buyer joining either 
platforms 1 or platform 2 is b
B. Moreover, v(z)≡0 for all z∈[0, 1] in the 
case. Thus, buyer-side demand for platform i (i＝1, 2) is 













)＋t(δ＋Δ)].       (16)
                  (2δ＋Δ)  2t
   
A structure that corresponds to the assumption b̅
B＞v’(0) in Section II 
is imposed. If a unit increase in demand generates “too much” marginal 
benefit through direct network externalities, then demand will signifi- 
cantly increase and generate substantial marginal benefit through direct 
network externalities. Thus, demand will neither be well-defined nor 
stable. The following assumption bounds the size of direct network ex- 
ternalities to rule out such situations.
5 If the market is not fully covered, then the case referred to as “local 
monopoly” occurs. Theorem 3 shows that the result derived in Theorem 1 holds 
in the “local monopoly” case.
COMPETITION IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORM MARKETS 351
Assumption 1.
    2
          v’(0)＜1  
(2δ＋Δ)t
For later use, A≡(2δ＋Δ)2t. Then, Assumption 1 can be written as 
(4/A) v’(0)＜1. The following lemma proves useful.
Lemma 1. 
(i) Downward sloping: 
∂D1
B
i   ∂D0
B
i
     ＜     ＜0 for i＝1, 2 and i≠j.
∂pi
B   
∂pi
B
(ii) Positive cross elasticity: 
∂D1
B
j   ∂D0
B
j
      ＞     ＞0 for i＝1, 2 and i≠j.
∂pi
B   ∂pi
B
(iii) Local concavity: Under symmetric prices 
         ∂
2 D1
B
i    
p1
B＝p2
B,       ≤0 
         ∂pi
B2
for i＝1, 2. This condition implies the concavity of log D1
B
i under symmetric 
prices.6
Proof. See Appendix 3.                                            □
With regard to seller-side, a seller has the following options: platforms 
1, 2, 01, and 02. The gross-per-transaction surplus of a seller who is 
joining platform i (i＝1, 2) is b




, a seller 




－τ|y－yi|,                       (17)
6 In equilibrium analysis, attention will be restricted to a symmetric equilibrium. 
However, this local concave property is insufficient to ensure that a symmetric 
equilibrium will be the global maximum, but can ensure that it is the local 
maximum. 
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FIGURE 6
DUOPOLY PLATFORMS: SELLER-SIDE
where τ denotes transportation cost and y1≡－Δ/2, y2≡Δ/2. 
By contrast, if a seller located at y joins platform 0i (i＝1, 2), then 
his/her utility will be 
b0
S
－τ|y－y0i|,                        (18)
where y01＝－(Δ/2)－δ  and y02＝(Δ/2)＋δ . Similar to the case of buyers, 
sellers located on [－(Δ/2)－δ, 0) will never choose platform 02, whereas 
those on (0, (Δ/2)＋δ ] will never join platform 01. b
S and b0
S
 are assumed 
to be sufficiently large, and thus, the seller-side market is fully covered.
The net surplus of a seller located at y1 who chooses platform 01 is 
depicted in the upper left of Figure 6, whereas that of a seller at y2 who 





, we can derive the seller-side demand for platform i 
(i＝1, 2) by following a logic similar to that of buyers, which is given as 
follows:













)＋τ(δ＋Δ)].       (19)
                 (2δ＋Δ)  2τ
Similar to that in the monopoly case, the manner in which indirect 
network effect occurs is illustrated by defining net per-transaction sur- 









































































).           (21)
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An increase in demand on one side leads to an increase in the 
average net surplus on the other side. This situation reflects indirect 
network effect among end users.
B. Pricing Decision
Platform i (i＝1, 2) attempts to maximize its profit by choosing pi
B and 
pi











This maximization problem is characterized by FOCs as follows: 







        ＝          ＋                        ＝0,
  ∂pi











)      ∂pi
B







        ＝          ＋                        ＝0,
  ∂pi











)     ∂pi
S
where i≠j.
Attention is limited to a symmetric equilibrium. Deriving an explicit 
expression for symmetric equilibrium prices for the hypothetical situation 
without direct network effect is a straightforward process that involves 
plugging in v(.)≡0 in Equations (43), (44), and (45) in Appendix 4. The 
existence of symmetric equilibrium for the proposed duopoly model with 
direct network effect can be deduced using Theorems 2 and 3.








S.7 Then, equilibrium conditions are pinned down to 
 
                                     D̂1
B
i
P̂B＋P̂S－c＝－           ,                     (22)




                                      D̂i
S
P̂B＋P̂S－c＝－            ,                    (23)









B, P̂B) and D̂i
S≡Di
S (P̂S, P̂S).
The elasticity of buyer-side demand for platform i (i＝1, 2) is defined 
7 A capital letter P is used to denote symmetric prices in a duopoly case to 
avoid confusion with prices in a monopoly case.






























).8 Then, we obtain the following 









(P̂S, P̂S).                   (25)
Equations (24) and (25) are necessary and sufficient conditions for 
symmetric equilibrium based on the local concavity of buyer-side de- 
mand. For notational simplicity, let ε ̂1B≡ε1Bi (P̂B, P̂B) and ε ̂S≡ε iS (P̂S, P̂S). 




(i) The total price of each platform P̂≡P̂
B＋P̂S is given by the standard 
Lerner formula for total volume elasticity as follows: 
                             P̂－c  1
     ＝  .                           (26)
                              P̂    ε ̂1
(ii) The price structure is given by the ratio of elasticities as follows: 
                             P̂
B   P̂S
   ＝   .                            (27)
                            ε ̂1B   ε ̂S
An appropriate expression for equilibrium prices is provided in 
Appendix 4.
C. With Direct Network Effect versus Without Direct Network 
Effectunder Duopoly
Similar to that in Section II, “benchmark” is defined as the situation 
where only cross-network effect exists. Assume v(z)≡0, ∀z∈[0, 1]. 

































P̂B) and ε1S (P̂S, P̂S)＝ε2S (P̂S, P̂S).
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Then, Ω＝1/2, and thus, symmetric optimal prices chosen by platforms 
are directly obtained using the expression of equilibrium prices provided 
in Appendix 4. 










)＋τ (δ＋Δ)}＋2c]   (28)
                5










)＋t(δ＋Δ)}＋2c]   (29)
                5





)＋τ(δ＋Δ)}＋4c]     (30)
                 5
For later use, the elasticity of buyer-side demand for platform i in the 
benchmark case is defined as 












)≡－          ＝                            ; 
               D0
B
i  ∂pi










B, P̃B), and ε i
S
(P̃S, P̃S) are denoted as ε ̃0B, ε ̃1B, and ε ̃S, 
respectively.
In the case under direct network effect, symmetric equilibrium prices 
P̂
B and P̂S are characterized by Proposition 3. Theorem 2 shows that 
under competition, the side with direct network effect can receive a 
discount if sufficient network externalities exist. Recall that ε ̃0B, ε ̃1B, and 
ε ̃S are elasticities evaluated at benchmark equilibrium prices P̃B and P̃S, 
whereas ε ̂1B and ε ̂S are evaluated at equilibrium prices under direct 











are corresponding demands evaluated at “P̃
B and P̃S” and “P̂B and P̂S”, 
respectively. P≡PB＋PS.
Theorem 2.
Unique symmetric solutions P̂
B and P̂S exist for solving Equations (26) 
and (27), respectively. 
Moreover, the following expressions hold: 
(i) If ε ̂1B＞ε ̂0B, then P̂B＜P̃B, P̂S＞P̃S, and P̂＜P̃.
(ii) If ε ̂1B＝ε ̂0B, then P̂B＝P̃B, P̂S＝P̃S, and P̂＝P̃.
(iii) If ε ̂1B＜ε ̂0B, then P̂B＞P̃B, P̂S＜P̃S, and P̂＞P̃.
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The necessary sufficient condition for (i) to occur is as follows: the mar- 







i ) is close to v’(D̃1
B
i ). The exact condition is 
given as follows:10
               (2A－6v’(D̃1
B
i))




i)).               (31)
               (2A－3v’(D̃1
B
i))
As a special case, if the marginal utility generated by direct network 
effect does not diminish (i.e., v”(z)＝0, ∀z∈[0, 1]), then (i) occurs. 
Proof. See Appendix 5.                                            □
Before investigating the implication of Theorem 2, note that the 
model considered in this section subsumes the monopoly platform case. 
Remember that full coverage has been assumed for illustrative simpli- 
city. Suppose that b
B and bS are insuffciently high. Then, as illustrated 
in Figure 7, buyers and sellers located near the center of the line [－(Δ/2)
－δ , δ＋(Δ/2)] may choose to join neither platforms 1 nor 2. This scen- 
ario indicates that the market is separated and each platform exercises 
market power in each region. In this study, this case is referred to as 
“local monopoly.” Theorem 3 shows that the result derived in Theorem 
1 holds under the “local monopoly” situation in the model considered in 
this section. 
Theorem 3.
Let the symmetric equilibrium prices for the local monopoly case be P̂
B* 





Moreover, let the symmetric equilibrium prices for the local monopoly 
case in the benchmark model (i.e., without direct network effect) be P̃
B* 
and P̃S*. Then, 
(i) equilibrium prices P̂
B* and P̂S* are uniquely determined.
(ii) Moreover, P̂B*≥P̃B*, P̂S*≤P̃S*, and P̂≥P̃ hold, where equalities are 
satisfied if and only if 




i ) always holds because of the (weak) concavity of 









i ) always holds. Thus, condition (31) provides the upper and lower 
bounds of avg(v(D̃1
B
i )), which ensure the occurrence of (i). In Appendix 5, this 
condition is demonstrated as necessary and sufficient for (i) to occur.


















Proof. See Appendix 4.                                             □
Similar to that in the monopoly case, demand-augmenting effect and 
demand-sensitizing effect coexist in a duopoly framework. However, 
unlike in the monopoly case, demand-sensitizing effect can dominate 
demand augmenting effect, thereby inducing competing platforms to 
provide discount to the buyer-side while penalizing the seller-side. In- 
tuitively, introducting platform competition into buyer-side limits demand- 
augmenting effect because competing platforms should split the total 
buyer-side demand. Consider a case in which δ  is extremely close to 0. 
In this case, competing platforms 1 and 2 nearly partition buyer-side. 
In such extreme case, a marginal reduction of t (increase in competi- 
tion) augments a negligible amount of demand, which in turn suggests 
that a marginal increase in demand that is purely attributed to direct 
network effect is also negligible (i.e., negligible demand-augmenting effect).
By contrast, demand sensitizing effect can prevail. Suppose platform 
i increases buyer-side price. Then, buyer-side demand for platform i 
decreases more severely in a competitive environment than in a less 
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competitive environment. Evidently, loss of demand will be maximized if 
v’(z)≡η , ∀z∈[0, 1] (i.e., in the case where the marginal utility generated 
by direct network effect does not increase as buyer-side demand for 
platform i decreases). However, if the marginal utility generated by direct 
network effect diminishes rapidly, then the reduction in demand caused 
by an increase in pi
B will be alleviated because the marginal effect in 
such scenario is stronger with lower demand, which counters the decre- 
asing pressure of demand. Condition (31) ensures that demand-sensitizing 
effect dominates demand-augmenting effect.
IV. Comparative Statistics
In this section, comparative statistics are provided under the as- 
sumption of linear direct network effect (i.e., v(z)≡ηz, ∀z∈[0, 1]). As 
shown in Theorem 2, introduction of direct network effect in this case 
reduces buyer-side price and increases seller-side price, while decreasing 
overall price. Though the assumption of linear direct network effect 
seems restrictive, the results provided in this section are preserved to 
the case where we allow moderate degree of diminishing marginal utility 
generated by direct network effect, because of continuity.
Under linear direct network effect, we can derive symmetric equilibrium 
prices explicitly using Equation (49) in Appendix 5, as shown in 
Appendix 7.
Theorem 4.
Assume that a linear direct network effect occurs. As the magnitude of 
direct network effect η  increases, buyer-side price P̂B decreases, seller-side 
price P̂S increases, and overall price P̂ decreases. 
Proof. See Appendix 7.                                            □
Theorem 5.
Assume that a linear direct network effect occurs. As the market 
power of the platforms increases in the seller-side (i.e., τ↑), buyer-side 
price P̂B decreases, seller-side price P̂S increases, and overall price P̂ de- 
creases.
Furthermore, given η＞0, the price gap between the benchmark and 
the case under direct network effect (i.e., P̃B－P̂B) increases as τ goes up. 
Proof. See Appendix 8.                                            □
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Theorem 5 indicates that even under direct network effect, the intro- 
duction of competition among platforms in the seller-side relieves the 
incentive of each platform to lower buyer-side price P̂
B (i.e., τ↓⇒ P̂B↑).
Theorem 6.
Assume that a linear direct network effect occurs. As the market 
power of the platforms increases on the buyer-side (i.e., t↑), buyer-side 
price P̂
B increases, seller-side price P̂S decreases, and overall price P ̂ 
increases.
However, whether the price gap between the benchmark and the case 
under direct network effect (i.e., P̃
B－P̂B) increases as t goes up remains 
unclear. 
Proof. See Appendix 9.                                            □
Although the sign of (∂/∂t)(P̃
B－P̂B) remains ambiguous, numerical 
simulations indicates that for nearly all parameter ranges, (∂P̂
B)/∂t＞





)－c and η  can (∂P̂B)/∂t＜(∂P̃B)/∂t occur. This result indicates that 
under sufficient direct network effect (i.e., sufficiently large η ), introdu- 
cing platform competition into the buyer-side can strengthen the incen- 
tive of each platform to lower buyer-side price P̂B (i.e., t↓⇒P̂B↓). This 
result is in line with Theorems 1 and 3, given that monopoly power on 
the buyer-side weakens demand-sensitizing effect relative to demand- 
augmenting effect, thereby resulting in an upward pressure on buyer- 
side price.
V. Conclusion
The optimal pricing strategy of monopoly/duopoly platform(s) where 
one side of a group is under direct network effect are investigated. In 
contrast to the monopoly platform framework where demand-augmenting 
effect dominates, either demand-augmenting effect or demand-sensitizing 
effect can dominate in the duopoly framework. In particular, if the 
marginal utility generated by direct network effect diminishes sufficiently 
slowly as buyer-side demand increases, then demand-sensitizing effect 
dominates, which induces competing platforms to lower buyer-side price 
and increase seller-side price. In this study, the sum of both prices 
decreases, which is in line with the pricing convention of platforms 
under the competitive environment illustrated in the introduction. These 
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real-world platforms typically charge low fees (or even allow free usage 
of platform services) to customers and charge high fees to content 
providers. Moreover, the result implies that even in the case where 
platforms charge seemingly excessively low prices to buyers, these pri- 
cing decisions may reflect strong direct network externalities instead of 
anticompetitive practices, thereby requiring close scrutiny.
In the special case under linear direct network effect (v(z)≡ηz, ∀z∈
[0, 1]), demand sensitizing effect dominates. Under this environment, 
the behaviour of competing platforms is strengthened as the magnitude 
of direct network effect increases. That is, buyer-side price decreases, 
whereas seller-side price increases. In addition, a stronger competition 
among platforms in the seller-side implies incentive of each platform to 
lower buyer-side price is reduced. By contrast, a stronger competition 
among platforms in the buyer-side implies incentive of each platform to 
provide a discount to the buyer-side is strengthened. Thus, the effect of 
introducing direct network effect on the equilibrium buyer-side price 
depends on the relative competitiveness of each side of the market.
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Appendix
A. Appendix 1
Equilibrium prices of the monopoly model
The equilibrium prices in Proposition 1 can be explicitly derived by 





(p̂B). The equilibrium prices are 






)}－b̅S＋c],           (32)
                     3








)}＋c],           (33)
                     3







)}＋b̅S＋c].            (34)
                     3
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B. Appendix 2
Alternative proof of Theorem 1 
The logic of the proof of Theorem 2 is analogous to that provided 
herein.
Proof. To compare p̂
B and p̂S with the benchmark p̃B and p̃S, note 
that the relation pB＋pS－c＝b̅S－pS holds in both cases in the equili- 
brium. Thus, pS＝(1/2) [b̅S＋c－pB] in both cases. By substituting this 
expression into Equations (6) and (7), we obtain the following equa- 
tions, respectively: 







                      2
                           1
b̅
S－pS＝  (b̅S－c＋pB)＝b̅B－pB.
                            2
The first expression characterizes the equilibrium of the case under 
direct and indirect network effects, whereas the second characterizes 
the equilibrium of the benchmark case. Therefore, based on the defini- 
tions of p̂
B, p̂S and p̃B, p̃S, 
　






(p̂B))],           (35)
                    2
                          1
b̅S－p̃S＝  (b̅S－c＋p̃B)＝b̅B－p̃B.                  (36)
                           2
Before proceeding, note that p
B＜b̅B,11 D1
B (pB)＞D0














(p̃B))]≥b̅B－p̃B appear pos- 
sible. However, the former turns out to be impossible.
To demontrate this situation, note that 







(p̃B))]＝                  [b̅B－v’(D1
B
(p̃B))]
                                       b̅B








 for a moderate value of c.
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B (p̃B))]≥b̅B－p̃B is equivalent to 
                         v(D1
B
(p̃B))
         ≥v’(D1
B
(p̃B)),
                           D1
B
(p̃B)
which always holds based on the assumption v”(z)≤0 ∀z∈[0, 1].
Hence, we obtain 






(p̃B))].           (37)
                  2
Evidently, the left side of the preceding equation is an increasing 
function of p








                        ＝        ‧[{b̅
B－v’(D1
B (pB)}
           dpB              dpB





via Remark 1.(i). That is, the right side of the preceding equation is a 
decreasing function of p
B.
Therefore, if the inequality in Equation (37) is strict, then a unique 





(p̃B))] holds. This condition suggests p̂S＝(1/2)[b̅S＋c－p̂B]＜(1/2)[b̅S
＋c－p̃B]＝p̃B and p̂＝(1/2)[b̅S＋c＋p̂B]＞(1/2)[b̅S＋c＋p̃B].
Moreover, p̂B＝p̃B, p̂S＝p̃S, and p̂＝p̃ hold if and only if Equation (37) 
holds in equality, and if and only if 
                         v(D1
B
(p̃B))
         ＝v’(D1
B (p̃B)).                     □





Proof. Without losing generality, let i＝1 and j＝2. First, we can 
directly calculate 
          ∂D0
B
1     2      ∂D0
B
2  1
     ＝－    and      ＝   from Equation (16).
           ∂p1
B     
A      ∂p1
B   
A
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Then, by differentiating D1
B






1  1         ∂D1
B
1        ∂D1
B
2
     ＝  [2v’(D1
B
1)     －v’(D1
B
2)     －2].
∂p1
B   A         ∂p1
B         ∂p1
B  
This equation can be rewritten as 
              1         ∂D1
B
1   1       ∂D1
B
2   ∂D0
B
1
[1－   2v’(D1
B
1)]     ＋  v’(D1
B
2)     ＝      .           (38)
              A         ∂p1
B   
A       ∂p1
B   
∂p1
B
Similarly, by differentiating D1
B
2 in Equation (15) with respect to p1
B
, 
we can show that 
              1         ∂D1
B
2   1       ∂D1
B
1   ∂D0
B
2
[1－   2v’(D1
B
2)]     ＋  v’(D1
B
1)     ＝      .           (39)
              A         ∂p1
B   
A       ∂p1
B   
∂p1
B
We can observe that Equations (38) and (39) form simultaneous 








) are unknowns. By 
solving these equations, we obtain 
                    2          ∂D0
B
1   v’(D1
B
2)
             {1－   v’(D1
B
2)}      －      
∂D1
B
1            A        ∂p1
B     
A2
     ＝                                            ,         (40)
∂p1
B









2)}－                         A            A              A2
                        ∂D0
B
2
                              
∂D1
B
2                    ∂p1
B
        
      ＝                                              .        (41)
∂p1
B        









2)}－                          A            A              A2
Consider Equation (40). The following relations hold based on Assum- 
ption 1: 






       A
         2                   3









         A                   A2
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2)}－             .
         A            A               A2




                          v’(D1
B
2)
                                
              ∂D0
B
1         A
2
                   －              
              ∂p1
B
        2





1                        A
      ＝                                 .               (42)
∂p1






                                     
             2                A2
         {1－  v’(D1
B
1)}－              
             A              2
                         {1－  v’(D1
B
2)}
                             A
Note that the denominator of Equation (42) is positive (given that a 
positive value divided by a positive term is positive) and smaller than 1 
(given that both 





                           
2                   A2
  v’(D1
B
1) and             
A                  2 
               {1－  v’(D1
B
2)}
                    A
are positive). Thus, the following relations hold: 
                        v’(D1
B
2)
                              
             ∂D0
B
1         A
2
                  －              
             ∂p1
B
         2





1                    A
     ＝                                
∂p1
B





                                     
             2                A2
         {1－  v’(D1
B
1)}－              
             A               2
                         {1－  v’(D1
B
2)}
                             A 
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              ∂D0
B
1
                   
                 ∂p1




     ＜                              ＜      .




2)   ∂p1
B
                                    
            2                A2
        {1－  v’(D1
B
1)}－              
            A              2
                        {1－  v’(D1
B
2)}
                            A
The first part of Lemma 1 is completed.
Consider Equation (41). The following relations hold based on 
Assumption 1. 
   






       A
       2                  3









      A                  A2









2)}－             )
      A           A             A
2
      2            2





      A            A
The denominator of Equation (41) is positive and smaller than 1. Thus, 
                         ∂D0
B
2
                              
∂D1
B
2                    ∂p1
B                        ∂D0
B
2
     ＝                                              ＞     .
∂p1
B        




2)      ∂p1
B




2)}－            
            A           A               A2
The second part of the proof is completed.
Now, the concavity of D1
B







. Without loss, let i＝1. For notational simplicity, 





1   1      ∂HN  ∂HD
      ＝    [HD‧    －     ‧HN]. 
∂p1
B2   
HD





First, note that HN＜ 0 and HD＞ 0 have already been established.  
(∂HN)/(∂p1
B)≤0 and (∂HD)/(∂p1
B)≤0, which implies that [HD‧(∂HN)/(∂











First, we can directly calculate 




2)  3        ∂D1
B
2
     ＝     ({1－  v’(D1
B
2)}      －      ＝   v”(D1
B
2)      ≤0. 
∂p1
B   ∂p1
B     A        ∂p1
B    A2    A2       ∂p1
B
Second, 













B      
A            A              A2
        ∂      2                   3         









       ∂p1
B     A                   A2   
             ∂D1
B
1   2    3                ∂D1
B
2    2    3
     ＝v”(D1
B




2)     [－  ＋   v’(D1
B
1)]
             ∂p1
B    
A   A2                ∂p1
B    A    A2




2               ＝v”(D1
B
1)[－  ＋  v’(D1
B
1)] (     ＋     ).                A   A2         ∂p1
B
   ∂p1
B
      













2), from which 
the last equality follows. Assumption 1 implies that [－(2/A)＋(3/A2)  
v’(D1
B
















)≤0. The third part of Lemma 1 is thus 
completed.                                                            □
D. Appendix 4






B, P̂B),∀i＝1,2. Then, the equilibrium prices of the 
duopoly model can be expressed as follows: 
      3Ω                               1                  
P̂




)＋t(δ＋Δ)]－       [(bS－b0
S
)＋τ(δ＋Δ)]
    3Ω＋1                            3Ω＋1                
(43)
       1
  ＋        c, 
     3Ω＋1 
     Ω＋1                       2Ω                     
P̂
S＝      [(bS－b0
S





    3Ω＋1                     3Ω＋1
(44)
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      2Ω
  ＋       c, 
    3Ω＋1
      Ω                                Ω      




)＋t(δ＋Δ)]＋      [(bS－b0
S
)＋τ(δ＋Δ)]
    3Ω＋1                            3Ω＋1
(45)
    2Ω＋1  
  ＋       c, 
    3Ω＋1
               2          1            




)}2          
               A           A
2           
where Ω≡                           .
                  2          1 





                  A          A
Proof. Recall that buyer-side demands are given by 














     A                 A      
From Lemma 1(i), the following expression is obtained:
                   2        2   v’(D1
B
j)    
               {1－  v’(D1
B
j)}   ＋            
∂D1
B
i               A        A    A
2  
     ＝－                                         , (i≠j).
∂pi
B









j)}－             
              A           A              A
2
Using the preceding expression, FOCs (22) and (23) can be expressed 
as
                2           1           

















                A           A
2





－c＝                                                           , (46)
                          2          1




)         
                          A          A   
           －P̂S＋(bS－b0
S)＋τ (δ＋Δ)
P̂B＋P̂S－c＝                       ,                  (47)





i (P̂, P̂),∀i＝1, 2. 
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After rearranging Equation (47) into P̂S＝(1/3)[－2P̂B＋(bS－b0
S
)＋2c＋












        2           1   





        A          A2        
Ω≡                          . 
           2         1  





           A         A   
Rearranging Equation (48) yields expression Equation (43). The 
expressions for P̂
S and P̂ can also be derived by substituting Equation 
(43) into Equation (47).                   □
E. Appendix 5
Theorem 2.
Proof. To compare P̂
B and P̂S with benchmark P̃B and P̃S, note first 





S)＋τ(δ＋Δ))/2 holds in 
both cases in equilibrium. This condition follows directly from the FOC 
with respect to pi
S






)＋τ (δ＋Δ))/2 is the expres- 










). Given that we are considering 




)＋τ (δ＋Δ))/2, or PS＝(1/3)[－2PB＋(bS－b0
S
)＋2c＋τ (δ＋Δ)] 









symmetric prices. By substituting these symmetric prices into Equation 
(22), we obtain 





)＋τ(δ＋Δ)－c]＝－         ,               (49)




   






)＋τ (δ＋Δ)－c]＝                       ,        (50)











The first relation characterizes the equilibrium of the case under both 
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direct and indirect network effects, whereas the second relation char- 
acterizes the benchmark case.








i based on 






























B) are both possible, 




























)＋τ(δ＋Δ)－c]＞－          .





The left side of the preceding equation is clearly an increasing func- 
tion of p
B. The right hand side is a decreasing function of PB. (Claim 1 
below.) This situation establishes that a unique price P̂B exists, which  
is strictly smaller than P̃
B, such that (1/3)[P̂B＋(bS－b0
S



















By reversing the sign, the ε ̃1B＝ε ̃0B and ε ̃1B＜ε ̃0B cases can be proven.
For the second part of the theorem, symmetric prices are assumed. 
Then, from Equations (14) and (15), 
                    1       
D1
B
i＝             {－P
B＋(bB－b0
B)＋t(δ＋Δ)}.              (51)
               A－avg(v(D1
B
i))         
Similarly, the following relation holds under symmetric prices according 
to Lemma 1.(i): 
                    ∂D1
B
i         2A－3v’(D1
B
i)                     
     ＝－                      .                 (52)
                    ∂pi
B




i))          
Thus,
      D1
B
i       A－v’(D1
B
i)     A－3v’(D1
B
i)               
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)) is equivalent to 
    (2A－6v’(D̃1
B
i))









    (2A－6v’(D1
B
i))





    (2A－3v’(D1
B
i))




i). The second 









) is a decreasing function of 
P
B. 
Proof. Without losing generality, let i＝1, j＝2. 
  d                    1   
    (D11 (P
B, PB)‧{－           })
dP




                               
                       ∂p1
B   
   ∂D1
B
1 (P
B, PB)  ∂D1
B
1 (P
B, PB)         1   
＝[{            ＋            }‧{－            }]                (54)
      ∂p1
B
          ∂p2
B




                                              
                                      ∂p1
B
               ∂D1
B
1 (P
B, PB)    ∂2D1
B
1 (P







B, PB)‧{             }－2‧{            ＋            }].
                   ∂p1
B
            ∂p1
B2






















＝1/A. Thus, by summing Equations (40) and (41), and then evaluating 




＝PB, we obtain 
                        ∂D1
B
1 (P
B, PB)  ∂D1
B
1 (P
B, PB)         
            ＋            ,                    (55)
                         ∂p1
B         ∂p2
B
                         1    3   
                       －  {1－  v’(D1
B
2 (P
B, PB))}         
                         A     A         
＝                                                                     ＜0. (56)













  ({1－  v’(D1
B
1(P
B, PB))}{1－  v’(D1
B
2(P
B, PB))}－                         
     A                  A                            A2 
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)}＞0, which implies that the first 
term in the bracket is negative.
Now, consider the second brackets. By summing Equations (40) and 













)           
             ＋             
     ∂p1
B          
∂p2
B      
(57)
                            1    3    






))           
                            A    A
2
         
＝                                                                        .

























))}－                            
      A                  A                              A
2
Differentiating Equation (57) with respect to p1
B
 and evaluating the 













                          
    ∂p1
B2       ∂p1
B∂p2
B 








)‧{   v”(D1
B
2 (P
B, PB))             }              
                A2                   ∂p1
B
＝                                           
                      HD
2
 
       1         1     3                ∂HD (P
B, PB)
＋            ‧[   {1－  v’(D1
B
2 (P
B, PB))}]‧            ,       (58)




)}2   A    A                    ∂p1
B
where 


















                 A                    A        









          －                             ＞0. 
                         A2




)＞0 based on Lemma 1(ii), the first 
term on the right side of Equation (58) is nonpositive.








B, PB))}]＞0 based on Assumption 
1. Moreover, we can demonstrate that (∂HD (P
B, PB))/(∂p1
B
)＜0 as follows: 
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∂HD (P
B, PB)
           
   ∂p1
B
   ∂       2   










B     
A
     3          









    A2
     2        ∂D1
B
1         ∂D1
B
2     3         ∂D1
B
1      
＝－  {v”(D1
B
1)       ＋v”(D1
B
2)       }＋  {v”(D1
B
1)       v’(D1
B
2)     
    A         ∂p1
B           ∂p1
B    A2         ∂p1
B 
           ∂D1
B
2   
  ＋v”(D1
B
2)       v’(D1
B
1)}
           ∂p1
B  








2    
＝－  v”(D1
B




1)‧(    ＋     )
    A         ∂p1
B
   ∂p1
B
    A2              ∂p1
B
   ∂p1
B
   




2  1     3
＝－v”(D1
B
1)‧(    ＋     )[  {2－  v’(D1
B
1)}],
            ∂p1
B   ∂p1
B  A     A     

























According to Assumption 1, (1/A){2－(3/A) v’(D1
B
1)}＞0. Moreover, v”≤0. 
Therefore, we conclude that (∂HD (P
B, PB))/(∂p1
B
)≤0. In addition, the se- 
cond term on the right side of Equation (58) is also nonpositive.
Given that both the first and the second terms on the right side of 























)}－2＞0, we conclude that the term in the second brackets in 
Equation (54) is nonpositive.
Given that the term in the first brackets in Equation (54) is negative 
and that in the second brackets is nonpositive, 
 d                     1
    (D11 (P
B, PB)‧{－            })＜0. 
dPB               ∂D1
B
1 (P
B, PB)   
                               
                        ∂p1
B
The proof of Claim 1 is thus completed.                             □
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F. Appendix 6
Theorem 3.
Proof. Without losing generality, fix i＝1. In equilibrium, the buyer- 
side and seller-side demands of platform 1 depend only on prices of this 
platform because the market for platform 1 is separated from that of 
platform 2. However, given that platforms 1 and 2 are symmetric, the 
equilibrium prices chosen by the two platforms agree with one another. 
Thus, subscript i is simply dropped in the prices, which are denoted as 
P
B*, PS*, and P*≡PB*＋PS*.
The threshold x̄M1 in Figure 7 can be solved by solving 




* (PB*))}－PB*－t(x̄M1＋  )＝0,
                             2
which yields x ̄M1＝(1/t)[{bB＋v(D1B1* (PB*))}－PB*－(Δ/2) t].
Moreover, x ̄L is derived by solving 
          Δ                                Δ
b0
B
－t(x ̄L＋  ＋δ )＝{bB＋v(D1B1* (PB*))}－PB*－t(－  －x ̄L),
          2                                2
which yields x ̄L＝(1/2t)[PB*－(bB－b0B)－v(D1B1* (PB*))－t(δ＋Δ)].
Thus, buyer-side demand for platform 1 is implicitly defined by 





(PB*)＝      (x̄M1－ x ̄L)
          2δ＋Δ    
          1       






          A  
Following a similar logic, seller-side demand for platform 1 is defined 
by 
             1   
D1
S*
(PS*)＝       (ȳM1－ȳL)
          (2δ＋Δ)
          1      
       ＝  [3(bS－PS*)＋(－b0
S
＋τδ )].
          A   
The FOCs for the maximization problem of platform 1 are given by 
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＋tδ )],     (59)
             3        A    
                           1
PB*＋PS*－c＝  [3(bS－PS*)＋(－b0
S＋τδ )].              (60)
                           3  
Equilibrium prices are denoted as P̂
B*, P̂S*, and P̂*≡P̂B*＋P̂S*.
As a benchmark, the case with no direct network effect (i.e., v(z)＝0,
∀z∈[0, 1]) is considered. In this case, the FOCs are given by 




＋tδ )],                (61)
                         3  




＋τδ )].                (62)
                         3




In both cases, PB*＋PS*－c＝(1/3)[3(bS－PS*)＋(－b0
S
＋τδ )] holds. By rear- 
ranging the terms, this equation is rewritten as 6PS*＝3(bS－PB*＋c)＋  
(－b0
S＋τδ ). Substituting this equation into Equations (59) and (61) yields 







＋τδ )＝2{1－        }
                                  A
(63)











＋tδ )],        (64)
where Equations (63) and (64) are evaluated at the corresponding equi- 
librium prices, respectively.
Henceforth, the logic of the proof is exactly same as that of Theorem 




*, the right sides of Equations (63) and (64) can be rewritten as 
follows. 




)        































)].             (66)
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), which always holds via the con- 
cavity of v(‧). Thus, we can conclude that 














         A    
Second, given that 3(P
B*＋bS－c)＋(－b0
S＋τδ ) is an increasing function 
of PB*, the proof is completed by showing that 




)        







         dP
B*          A      
which is confirmed true.                                             □
G. Appendix 7
Theorem 4.
Proof. By using Equation (49) in Appendix 5, the closed form equili- 
brium prices of the model in Section IV can be calculated as follows: 
       A－3η                             1
                                              
       2A－3η                             3
P̂B＝             {(bB－b0
B
)＋t(δ＋Δ)}＋             (－1)
     1   A－3η                      1   A－3η
      ＋                             ＋           
     3  2A－3η                      3   2A－3η
(67)





)＋2c＋τ(δ＋Δ)].             (68)
Given that (∂/∂η )((A－3η )/(2A－3η ))＝－3A/((2A－3η )2)＜0, an increase 
in η  reduces the weight of the first term in Equation (67) and increases 
that of the second term. This situation clearly reduces P̂
B, and thus, 
increases P̂S. Using the same argument in the proof of Theorem 2, the 
overall price P̂ decreases.                                             □
H. Appendix 8
Theorem 5.
Proof. Differentiating Equation (67) with respect to τ yields (∂P̂B)/  
(∂τ )＝－(1/3)/(1/3＋(A－3η )/(2A－3η ))(δ＋Δ). For any η＞0 that satisfies 
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Assumption 1, this value is smaller than that of the benchmark case (η
＝0)(∂P̃B)/∂τ＝－2/5(δ＋Δ), which is smaller than 0. Thus, for any 
given η＞0, an increase in τ reduces P̂B more severely than in the case 
η＝0, which implies that the variations of P̂S and P̂ are also larger 
under direct network effect.                                          □
I. Appendix 9
Theorem 6.
Proof. A≡(2δ＋Δ)2t, and thus, (∂/∂t)((A－3η )/(2A－3η ))＝((2δ＋Δ) 
6η )/((2A－3η )2)＞0. Therefore, increments in t increases both the weight 
of the first term in Equation (67) and the first term itself, which results 
in higher P̂B. This situation clearly reduces P̂S and increases P̂.
Denote G≡(A－3η )/(2A－3η ) and H≡(∂/∂t)((A－3η )/(2A－3η ))＝((2δ
＋Δ)6η )/((2A－3η )2)(＞0). By rearranging Equation (67), the following is 
obtained:







3                              3  
Differentiating the preceding equation with respect to t and rear- 
ranging its terms yield 
∂P̂
B     H                              G      
    ＝        {(bB－b0
B)＋t(δ＋Δ)－P̂B}＋        (δ＋Δ)
∂t    1/3＋G                        1/3＋G
         H       1          




)＋τ(δ＋Δ)－c}]   (69)
      1/3＋G  1＋3G           
         G
    ＋        (δ＋Δ).
      1/3＋G
Note that (∂P̃
B)/∂t＝(3/5)(δ＋Δ). The last term in Equation (69) is 
evidently smaller than (∂P̃
B)/∂t＝(3/5)(δ＋Δ) if η＞0. However, the first 
term in Equation (69) is positive, and thus, the relative sizes of (∂P̂B)/
∂t and (∂P̃B)/∂t remain ambiguous.                                 □
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